By using a simple North-South trade model with vertically related markets, this paper draws our attention to previously unidentified effects of foreign direct investment (FDI), namely that a North downstream firm affects the pricing behavior of an input supplier through technology spillovers and market integration led by FDI. Whether the North firm strategically undertakes FDI in the presence of technology spillovers depends on South firm's capacity to absorb North's technology. When the capacity is not very high, the North firm could actually gain from technology spillovers to the South firm. FDI may benefit all producers and consumers.
I Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been expanding dramatically.
1 FDI is undertaken for various reasons such as cost saving, tariff-jumping and information acquiring. 2 The purpose of this paper is to draw our attention to previously unidentified motives for FDI. In particular, we are concerned with "strategic" motives. In an oligopolistic market, strategic interactions usually arise. Strategic motives in the present study mean that firms undertake FDI to take advantage of such strategic interactions under international oligopoly. Specifically, constructing a simple North-South model with vertically related markets, 3 we identify strategic incentives for a North firm to invest in South.
The outline of our model is as follows. There are two countries, North and South. In each country, there is a downstream firm, but the South downstream firm may be a potential entrant.
The final good is sold in North. There is an upstream firm in South. The North downstream firm may strategically choose South as its plant location. The North downstream firm imports the intermediate good if it locates in North, but exports the final good if it locates in South. We explore the North firm's decision in two cases. In the first case, the South downstream firm is a potential entrant (hereafter, the potential-entrant case). In the second case, it is an incumbent (hereafter, the incumbent case).
When constructing our model, we specifically take the following two features into account.
First, the price discrimination is widely observed between countries. However, it is not the case within a country. This is due to the presence of a regulation, an arbitrage opportunity within a country, and so on. For instance, it is illegal to price-discriminate in the US under a federal law, the Robinson-Patman Act. We should mention that intermediate goods are no exception to the price discrimination. Examples include dumping in the semiconductor industry. 4 ' 5 Therefore, it is assumed in our model that the upstream firm price-discriminates between two downstream firms as long as they are located in the different countries. However, if the North downstream firm undertakes FDI and is located in South, the upstream firm sets the uniform price between the North and the South downstream firms. That is, the intermediate-good market is segmented without FDI, but is integrated with FDI.
Market integration has been analyzed in the international trade literature, particularly in the context of regional trade agreements such as customs unions and free trade agreements. 6 As far 1 For example, see the online data base of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/). 2 See Dunning (1977) and Caves (2007) , for example. Chakrabarti (2001) summarizes the determinants of FDI in different studies. 3 The literature on FDI acknowledges the importance of vertically related markets. For example, say "multinationals' demand for intermediate inputs, ..., can induce changes in the domestic industrial structure and can kick-start the development of local industry" and confirm this by using Irish data. 4 A well-known example is that the Semiconductor Industry Association accused the Japanese semiconductor industry of conducting dumping in the US market in the mid 1980's. 5 For arguments over the price discrimination in the input market, see Katz (1987) , DeGraba (1990 ), Yoshida (2000 and Valletti (2003) , among others. 6 For example, see Smith and Venables (1988) , Ishikawa (2004) and Ishikawa et al. (2007) .
as we know, however, no study has connected FDI with market integration in the intermediategood market. An interesting point is that FDI could be motivated by price discrimination in the intermediate-good markets. This motive should be distinguished from another motive to reduce transport and other trade costs. In this paper, the effect that FDI leads to market integration of the intermediate good is referred to as "the market integration effect".
Typical examples fitting our argument are natural resources. The Chinese government has been controlling the exports of rare earth to increase the prices in the foreign markets. 7 By doing so, the Chinese government intends to induce high-tech firms using rare earth as the key inputs to produce in China. In fact, Hitachi Materials and Showa Denko have recently decided to shift the production of high-performance magnets and high-performance alloys, respectively, to China. 8 They have never produced those goods outside of Japan to prevent technology leakage.
Similarly, to attract FDI, petroleum exporting countries in the Middle East strategically offer materials such as natural gases to foreign petrochemical companies at low prices. The material price paid by Petro Rabigh, which is a joint venture between Sumitomo Chemical and Saudi
Aramco and is one of the largest petrochemical plants in the world, is about one tenth of that paid by foreign rivals in developed countries (Nikkei, November 11, 2009 Levinthal (1989, 1990) , we call such a capacity "absorptive capacity". We show that South firm's absorptive capacity also plays a crucial role in 7 The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan points out that the price gaps between Chinese markets and foreign markets are extraordinarily large. 8 Toyota has recently announced to produce key parts such as engines for hybrid vehicles in China, because rare earth is indispensable to those high-tech parts (Nikkei, September 4, 2011) . 9 With respect to manufacturing, Nikkei Business (October 4, 1993) reports that the prices of intermediate inputs (such as ABS polymer, polystyrene and galvanized sheet steel) for a Japanese consumer electronics company are more than 30% lower in Thailand than in Japan. Recently, the largest Japanese consumer electronics company, Panasonic, has decided to shift the procurement department from Japan to Singapore to procure cheap parts and produce outside Japan (Nikkei, August 11, 2011) . 10 For emprical evidences, see Kokko (1994) , Dimelis and Louri (2002) , Griffith et al. (2002) , ,2003 ), Smarzynska Javorcik (2004 ), and Branstetter (2006 , for example. For theoretical studies, see Findlay (1978) , Ethier and Markusen (1986) , and Saggi (1999,2002) , for example. 11 Empirical studies such as Eaton and Kortum (1999), Branstetter (2001) and Keller (2002) suggest that knowledge spillovers are geographically localized. 12 See, for example, Findly (1978) , Kokko (1994) and Glass and Saggi (1998). our analysis.
In the presence of FDI spillovers, FDI seems detrimental to the interests of the investing firm, because it makes competition tougher either by making the local incumbent firm more efficient or by creating a new rival. In the potential-entrant case, however, the "investing" firm may gain from FDI spillovers. In other words, the investing firm may take advantage of FDI Another contrast between the potential-entrant case and the incumbent case is that FDI induces the South firm to enter the market in the former, while it may force the South firm to exit the market in the latter. In general, the entry is induced by the technology spillover effect, while the exit is due to intensified competition. 14 In our incumbent case, FDI increases the intermediate-input price due to the market integration effect, which could dominate the technology spillover effect and induce exit.
There are not many studies that deal with strategic motives of FDI. Horstmann and Markusen (1987) and Vannini (1998) 13 Even in the incumbent case, the investing firm could gain from technology spillovers (see Proposition 3). 14 It is widely observed that FDI leads to both entry and exit of local firms depending on countries and industries.
See ,2003 ), De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003 ), Smarzynska Javorcik (2004 , and , for example.
Our analysis is also related to Markusen and Venables (1999) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3
shows that the North firm may have incentives to undertake FDI because of market integration and technology spillovers. Section 4 concludes the paper.
II The Basic Model
There are two countries, North and South, each with one downstream firm denoted by firm N and firm S, respectively. There is a single upstream firm, firm M , which is located in South. The inverse demand for the final good is given by
where p and X are, respectively, the price and the demand of the final good. 16 One unit of the intermediate good is required for each unit of the final good. The MC to produce the intermediate 15 The assumption that firm M is in South and consumers of the final product are in North is innocuous. The main results still hold without this assumption. This assumption follows from the case of natural resources in Section 1. 16 Even if the demand function is non-linear, the essence of our results would not change.
good is normalized to be zero. If firms N and S are, respectively, located in North and South, firm M can set the different prices across firms, r N and r S , because of market segmentation. 17 If both firms are located in South, however, firm M is forced to set the uniform price, r, because of a single market. The MC to produce the final good from the intermediate good is c N for firm N and c S for firm S. When firm N does not invest in South, c S is equal to c S which is exogenously given. When firm N undertakes FDI, on the other hand, c S depends on the firm S's capacity to absorb firm N 's technology (i.e., "absorptive capacity"). For simplicity, the absorptive capacity, α, is exogenously given. Specifically, in the presence of FDI, the relationship between the MC and the absorptive capacity is given by
α = 0 implies the nil capacity and c S = c S holds. On the other hand, α = 1 implies the perfect capacity and c S = c N .
The profits of firms M , N , and S are, respectively, given by
where x i (i = N, S) is the output of firm i; and f i (i = N, S) is the setup fixed cost (FC). To focus on the strategic motive for FDI, we assume that for firm N, both MC and FC are identical between North and South. That is, there is no cost-saving motive for firm N to undertake FDI.
Since the setup FCs are not crucial to derive our main results, we set f i = 0 (i = N, S) for simplicity.
III Strategic Motives for FDI
In this section, we show that firm N may have incentives to undertake FDI because of the market integration effect and the technology spillover effect. We consider two cases. In the first case, c S is too high for firm S to enter the market. That is, firm S is a potential entrant and its entry is possible only if firm N undertakes FDI (i.e., the potential-entrant case). In the second case, c S is low enough for firm S to serve the final-good market, that is, firm S can serve the final-good market without firm N 's FDI (i.e., the incumbent case).
(i) The Potential-Entrant Case
We solve the game by backward induction. There are two cases in the last stage. Firm S does not enter the market in the first case and does in the second case. Without firm S's entry, 17 Market segmentation stems from regulations, laws, transport costs, etc. For example, if parallel imports are prohibited by law, then arbitrage across countries would not occur. If market segmentation is due to the presence of trade costs, we need to introduce trade costs into the model. However, this modification would not affect the essence of our results. 18 The conditions under which each case arises are given in footnote 22.
firm N monopolizes the market. In either case, a single intermediate-good price prevails. In the absence of firm S, firm N is a monopolist in the final-good market.
In the first case, given the intermediate-good price, r N , the equilibrium is given by
where a superscript "N " stands for the case without firm S's entry.
With firm S's entry, the duopoly between firms N and S arises. Given r SS , we obtain
where a superscript "SS" stands for the case with firm S's entry. In stage 3, firm S enters the market if and only if π SS S > 0. We now consider stage 2 in which given the FDI decision of firm N , firm M sets the price in the intermediate-good market to maximize its profits under the derived demand. Without FDI,
Asterisk " * "denotes equilibrium value.
With FDI, on the other hand, firm M has two options: charging the high price so that only firm N is served or charging the low price to accommodate firm S's entry. Firm M compares its profits between these two cases. In the former case, the equilibrium is given by (7) and (8). In the latter, facing the derived demand (5), firm M charges the uniform price
for the intermediate good. Therefore,
.
For x

SS * S
> 0, we need 2b − 7c S + 5c N > 0, i.e., c S < (2b + 5c N )/7 ≡ e c. The difference in the profits of firm M between the two cases is
where ∆π
).
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A superscript "E" stands for the potential-entrant case. We can verify c N < c
Thus, the following lemma is immediate. We now consider stage 1. Comparing the profits of firm N with and without firm S's entry, we have
< e c and Lemma 1, we establish the following lemma. , firm N has no incentive to undertake FDI.
The difference in the total output is
where the inequality comes from c S < c
. As is expected, the total output is larger in the presence of firm S. Therefore, Lemma 4 Consumers never lose from FDI. If FDI leads firm S to enter the market, consumers as well as firm S necessarily gain.
The above analysis establishes the following proposition. 
(ii) The Incumbent Case
We next consider the incumbent case. There are two cases in the last stage. In the first case, firm N undertakes FDI and both firms N and S are located in South. This case has been examined in the last subsection. As we see below, however, firm S may be forced to exit the market in this case. This depends on the pricing behavior of firm M .
In the second case, firms N and S, respectively, produce in North and in South. In this case, there exist no technology spillovers and hence c S = c S . Also firm M can price-discriminate 21 Since firm S cannot be more efficient than firm N, firm S's enty never increases the intermediate-good price. between firms N and S, because of market segmentation. Given the intermediate-good prices, r NS N and r NS S , the equilibrium is given by
where "NS" stands for the case in which firms N and S, respectively, produce in North and in South.
With price discrimination, firm M sets the prices of the intermediate good, r N and r S as follows:
Then,
There are two opposing effects of firm N 's FDI on firm M 's profits. Under FDI, firm M is forced to set the uniform price, which reduces firm M 's profits relative to the case without FDI.
On the other hand, FDI generates technology spillovers from firm N to firm S, which allows firm M to increase the intermediate-good price relative to the case without any technology spillovers.
Thus, firm M may or may not gain from FDI. We have
where a superscript "I" stands for the incumbent case. ∆π
implies that the technology spillovers from firm N to firm S are large enough to benefit firm M .
When ∆π I M < 0, firm M has two options in the presence of FDI. One is to keep serving both firms N and S. The other is to stop serving firm S by charging a high price for the intermediate good. It should be noted that in either case, firm N 's FDI is harmful to firm M , which never happens in the potential-entrant case (recall Lemma 2). Since π SS * M is decreasing with respect 22 We can conclude from (15) Lemma 5 is illustrated in Figure 3 FDI, because technology spillovers make firm S more efficient. 24 The difference in the profits of firm S is
SS=NS S
). In view of (9) and (15) The above result is illustrated in Figure 3 For consumers, unless FDI leads firm S to exit the final-good market, FDI is beneficial. In 
, we have ∆π , the positive effect dominates the negative effect for each firm and all firms gain.
In view of Figure 4 , it should be pointed out that we can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Firm N could benefit from technology spillovers to firm S not only in the potential entrant case but also in the incumbent case.
To see this, first suppose that technology spillovers are absent in 
IV Concluding Remarks
We have identified strategic incentives for a North downstream firm to invest in South in vertically related markets. Both the technology spillover effect and the market integration effect play crucial roles. We explore two cases. In the potential-entrant case, the South downstream firm can enter the market only if FDI is undertaken. In the incumbent case, the South downstream firm can serve the market without FDI. In both cases, FDI makes the South downstream firm In concluding this paper, six final remarks are in order. First, both the technology spillover effect and the market integration effect are necessary for the North downstream firm to benefit from FDI in the potential-entrant case, while the market integration effect alone makes the North downstream firm better off in the incumbent case. For the upstream firm and the South downstream firm, the technology spillover effect is beneficial, while the market integration effect is harmful. Thus, the technology spillover effect is necessary for the upstream firm and the South downstream firm to gain. For the North downstream firm, however, the technology spillover effect may or may not be harmful. As pointed out, the technology spillover effect may further increase the benefit for the North downstream firm. Fifth, we can reinterpret the upstream as labor unions as in Mukherjee et al. (2008) . Without FDI, each firm hires workers from a separate labor union (i.e., a labor union in each country).
With FDI, however, both (downstream) firms hire workers from a common labor union in South, which sets a uniform wage. We can also reinterpret the upstream as governments that intend to maximize tax revenue. 29 Whereas each firm faces a tax rate set by each government without FDI, both (downstream) firms face a common tax rate imposed by the South government with FDI.
Lastly, FDI creates various linkages between MNEs and local firms. Both horizontal and vertical linkages are important. However, the number of empirical studies that investigate the effects of MNEs on local rivals through suppliers is rather limited. 30 More empirical investigation of this kind of linkage including one suggested in our analysis is left for future research. 
